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Case C-267/06, Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen, 
Judgment of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of 1 April 2008, not 
yet reported.
1. Introduction
Maruko is the first case decided by the Court of Justice under Directive 
2000/78/EC that concerns discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. 
Earlier cases involving arguments regarding such discrimination either arose 
at a time when this Directive was not yet adopted (Grant)1 or concerned the 
Staff Regulations (D and Sweden v. Council).2 Like Maruko, these earlier cases 
concerned facilities for the partners of employees. In those cases the interpre-
tation of EC law provided by the Court of Justice was not favourable for the 
plaintiffs.3 Maruko is the first decision on discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation in the Court of Justice’s case law that is favourable for the plaintiff. 
However, Maruko is not only important for being a “first” in this sense and for 
being “part of the long process of accepting homosexuality, which is a vital 
step towards achieving equality and respect for all human beings”, as stated by 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in his Opinion on Maruko (para 2). In 
addition, the case is important in the context of the division of competences 
between the EC and the Member States, in particular in relation to civil status, 
as well as regarding the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination 
even beyond the field of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. It is 
therefore not surprising that the judgment was handed down by a Grand 
 Chamber of the Court of Justice.
1. Case C-249/96, Lisa Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd., [1998] ECR I-621.
2. Joined Cases C-122/99 P & C-125/99 P, D and Sweden v. Council, [2001] ECR I-4319.
3. In Grant, the Court refused to interpret the term “discrimination on grounds of sex” as 
including unfavourable treatment of an employee because she had a same-sex partner. The 
employee was refused a salary benefit for her partner whilst employees with an opposite-sex 
partner received the benefit. On Grant, see e.g. McInnes, 36 CML Rev. (1999), 1043–1058. In 
D and Sweden v. Council, the Court found that the EU staff law in force at the time did not pro-
hibit unfavourable treatment of a worker having a registered same-sex partner as compared to a 
worker being married to a different-sex partner. On this case, see e.g. Ellis, 39 CML Rev. (2002), 
151–157. In 2004, the Staff Regulations were revised so as to treat registered non-marital part-
nerships in the same way as marriages, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled (see the very 
end of this annotation).
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2. Facts and legal issues
Under German law, marriage is reserved to opposite-sex couples and a regis-
tered partnership is reserved to same-sex couples. In 2001 Mr Maruko and his 
male partner had their partnership registered in Germany. Mr Maruko’s partner 
used to work as a designer of theatrical costumes. In that capacity, he was a 
continuous member of the German Theatre Pension Institution (Versorgungs-
anstalt der deutschen Bühnen, VddB) since 1959. When he died in 2005, Mr 
Maruko applied for a widower’s pension but was refused it because the Pen-
sion Regulations did not provide for a pension in such a situation. Under the 
relevant provision, “[t]he spouse of the insured woman or retired woman, if 
the marriage subsists on the day of the latter’s death, shall be entitled to a 
 widower’s pension.” In the original German language the word “spouse” in 
this rule indicates a male person (“der Ehemann einer Versicherten oder 
Ruhegeldempfängerin”). Conversely, it indicates a female person in the paral-
lel rule on widow’s pensions (“die Ehefrau eines Versicherten oder Ruhegeld-
empfängers”). After an unsuccessful appeal Mr Maruko brought an action to 
the competent administrative court (the Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht 
München), arguing that to refuse him a widower’s pension was contrary to 
Directive 2000/78/EC4 (the so-called Employment Equality Directive). In his 
opinion, the survivors’ pensions paid under the VddB pension system consti-
tute pay, and as such are covered by Directive 2000/78/EC by virtue of its Arti-
cle 3(1)(c), rather than a social security benefit as excluded by Article 3(3). 
According to Mr Maruko, to refuse him such a benefit amounts to indirect dis-
crimination on grounds of the sexual orientation of the employee in question 
(i.e. Mr Maruko’s partner), and as such is prohibited under Articles 1 and 2(2)
(b) of the Directive. The national court having doubts about the interpretation 
of the Directive, requested a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice on 
the following questions:
“1. Is a compulsory occupational pension scheme, such as the scheme at 
issue in this case administered by the [VddB], a scheme similar to State 
schemes as referred to in Article 3(3) of Council Directive 2000/78 …?
2. Are benefits paid by a compulsory occupational pension institution to 
survivors in the form of widow’s/widower’s pensions to be construed as 
pay within the meaning of Article 3(1)(c) of Directive 2000/78 …?
3. Does Article 1 in conjunction with Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/78 
… preclude regulations governing a supplementary pension scheme under 
which a registered partner does not after the death of his partner receive 
survivor’s benefits equivalent to those available to spouses, even though, 
4. Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employ-
ment and occupation, O.J. 2000, L 303/16.
Case C-267/06 725
like spouses, registered partners live in a union of mutual support and as-
sistance formally entered into for life?
4. If the preceding questions are answered in the affirmative: Is discrimina-
tion on grounds of sexual orientation permissible by virtue of Recital 22 in 
the preamble to Directive 2000/78 …?
5. Would entitlement to the survivor’s benefits be restricted to periods 
from 17 May 1990 in the light of the case law in Barber …?”
Questions 1 and 2 must be read against the background of Recital 13 in the pre-
amble of the Directive, which states: “This Directive does not apply to social 
security and social protection schemes whose benefits are not treated as income 
within the meaning given to that term for the purpose of applying Article 
141 EC.” Regarding question 3, it should be noted that whilst Mr Maruko 
argued indirect discrimination under Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/EC, 
the national court’s reference to Article 2(2)(a) concerns direct discrimination. 
As will be seen, that is a key issue in the Maruko case. As for question 4, 
Recital 22 states that the Directive is “without prejudice to national laws on 
marital status and the benefits dependent thereon”.
3. Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer began his Opinion by analysing 
whether Directive 2000/78/EC can be relied on at all in a situation like that of 
Mr Maruko (para 29). The facts of the Maruko case (namely the refusal to 
grant Mr Maruko a pension) occurred in February 2005. At that time, the 
period for the implementation of the Directive had long expired, namely on 
2 December 2003. However, the German implementing legislation (the Gesetz 
zur Umsetzung Europäischer Richtlinien zur Verwirklichung des Grundsatzes 
der Gleichbehandlung, or Law transposing the European Directives on the 
principle of equal treatment) was enacted only on 14 August 2006. Accord-
ingly, the Maruko case concerned a situation of an alleged difference between 
a national rule and an unimplemented EC Directive, and Mr Maruko tried to 
directly rely on provisions of the latter. The Advocate General opined that this 
does not pose any problem, since, first, the Directive contains an unconditional 
and precise prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, 
and, second, the VddB is a public-law body with legal personality and under 
the administrative control of the State (vertical direct effect of provisions of a 
directive).5
5. See annotation of Maruko by Mok, (2008) Nederlandse Jurisprudentie – Uitspraken in 
burgerlijke en strafzaken, No. 350.
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 In a next step, the Advocate General discussed the scope of Directive 
2000/78/EC (paras. 36 et seq.). He turned to the case law on equal pay from the 
area of sex equality law and recalled that occupational pensions can fall under 
the concept of pay, the decisive criterion being the relationship of the pension 
with the employment. In the present case, the Advocate General found that the 
VddB survivors’ pension does indeed fall under the notion of pay, and that 
insofar it is covered by Directive 2000/78/EC. 
 Regarding Recital 22, the Advocate General explained that its role is merely 
to assist with the interpretation of the provisions of the Directive (para 76). He 
agreed that the Community has no powers with regard to marital status. How-
ever, whilst Community law accepts each Member State’s definition of mar-
riage, singleness, widowhood, and other forms of “civil (marital) status”, the 
Member States must exercise that competence in a manner that does not 
infringe Community law (para 77). The prohibition of discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation is part of that law, in particular in relation to pay. 
Accordingly, Recital 22 does not prevent cases such as that of Mr Maruko 
from falling within the scope of application of Directive 2000/78/EC.
 The Advocate General then turned to the question of whether the refusal to 
grant Mr Maruko a survivor’s pension amounts to discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation (paras. 83 et seq.). In his analysis, the reason why Mr 
Maruko was refused a pension was that he was not married to his partner and, 
therefore, is not a “widower” within the meaning of the pension fund regula-
tions. The Advocate General argued that since the refusal was not based on the 
sexual orientation of the insured, there is no direct discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation. Instead, he considered that the case involves indirect dis-
crimination, which occurs where an apparently neutral provision puts persons 
having a particular sexual orientation at a disadvantage, unless that discrimina-
tion is objectively justified by a legitimate aim.
 According to him, the present case does not concern the access to marriage 
as such (which under German law is reserved to opposite-sex couples), but 
rather the effects of two types of union governed by different legal arrange-
ments, namely marriage and the registered partnership. It is therefore neces-
sary to establish whether those two types of union warrant equal treatment, for 
which purpose the national court must determine whether the legal situation of 
spouses is akin to that of persons in a registered civil partnership. The Advo-
cate General concluded (para 102): “On that premise, refusal to grant a pen-
sion on the grounds that a couple has not married, where two persons of the 
same sex are unable to marry and have entered into a union which produces 
similar effects, constitutes indirect discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
contrary to Article 2 of Directive 2000/78.”
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 Finally, regarding the temporal effect of a judgment of the Court of Justice 
that would find discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in relation to a 
situation like that of Mr Maruko, the Advocate General recalled that case law 
permits a restriction of the right to rely on a provision only in exceptional cir-
cumstances, namely where there is a risk of serious economic repercussions 
owing in particular to the large number of legal relationships entered into in 
good faith on the basis of rules considered to be validly in force. Since the 
assessment of the risk requires the knowledge of a number of factors, of which 
the Court was not informed, the Advocate General suggested that the Court 
does not give a reply to this question (paras. 105 et seq.).
4. Judgment of the Court of Justice
The Court began by addressing the scope of the Directive, as relevant against 
the background of a case like Maruko (paras. 34 et seq. of the judgment). The 
Court stated that the scope of the Directive must be understood, in the light of 
Article 3(1)(c) and (3) of the Directive read in conjunction with Recital 13 of 
the Preamble to the Directive, as excluding inter alia social security or social 
protection schemes, the benefits of which are not equivalent to pay within the 
meaning given to that term for the application of Article 141 EC. Accordingly, 
the Court set out to determine whether a survivor’s benefit granted under an 
occupational pension scheme such as that managed by the VddB can be treated 
as equivalent to “pay” within the meaning of Article 141 EC. Like the Advo-
cate General, the Court recalled its earlier case law according to which, for the 
purposes of assessing whether a retirement pension falls within the scope of 
Article 141 EC, the one criterion that may prove decisive of several criteria is 
whether the retirement pension is paid to the worker by reason of the employ-
ment relationship between him and his former employer, that is to say, the cri-
terion of employment. In relation to VddB pensions, the Court found that the 
VddB is a compulsory occupational pension system for a particular category 
of workers set up by a collective agreement, and that it is financed by the 
employers and the employees of the relevant industry, to the exclusion of any 
contribution by the State, that the amount of the pension is not fixed by statute 
but rather calculated by reference to the total amount of the contributions paid 
throughout the worker’s membership. Accordingly, the benefit in question is 
pay within the meaning of Directive 2000/78/EC.
 As regards Recital 22 of the Preamble to Directive 2000/78/EC, the Court 
recalled that whilst civil status and the benefits flowing from it are matters 
which fall within the competence of the Member States, and Community law 
does not detract from that competence, in the exercise of that competence the 
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Member States must comply with Community law and, in particular, with the 
provisions relating to the principle of non-discrimination. Accordingly, where 
a benefit falls within the scope of Directive 2000/78, Recital 22 of the Pream-
ble to Directive 2000/78 cannot affect the application of the Directive.
 The Court then turned to the question of whether a case such as that of Mr 
Maruko involves discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation (paras. 62 et 
seq.). After having recalled the legal definitions of direct and indirect discrim-
ination in Article 2 of the Directive, the Court referred to various statements of 
the national court in relation to marriage and registered partnerships under 
German law. According to the national court, there is a gradual movement 
towards recognizing equivalence of the two regimes. As a consequence, a reg-
istered partnership, while not identical to marriage, places persons of the same 
sex in a situation comparable to that of spouses as far as the survivor’s benefit 
at issue in the main proceedings is concerned. However, the national court 
finds that entitlement to that survivor’s benefit is restricted, under the provi-
sions of the VddB Regulations, to surviving spouses and is denied to surviving 
registered partners. The Court of Justice continued:
“71… That being the case, those life partners are treated less favourably 
than surviving spouses as regards entitlement to that survivor’s benefit.
72 If the referring court decides that surviving spouses and surviving life 
partners are in a comparable situation so far as concerns that survivor’s 
benefit, legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings must, as a 
consequence, be considered to constitute direct discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation, within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2(2)(a) of Di-
rective 2000/78.
73 It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the third question must 
be that the combined provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of Directive 2000/78 
preclude legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings under 
which, after the death of his life partner, the surviving partner does not 
receive a survivor’s benefit equivalent to that granted to a surviving spouse, 
even though, under national law, life partnership places persons of the 
same sex in a situation comparable to that of spouses so far as concerns 
that survivor’s benefit. It is for the referring court to determine whether a 
surviving life partner is in a situation comparable to that of a spouse who 
is entitled to the survivor’s benefit provided for under the occupational 
pension scheme managed by the VddB.”
Finally, regarding the effects of the judgment in terms of time, the Court’s 
answer was very brief (paras. 77–79). The Court recalled that it is only excep-
tionally that the Court, taking account of the serious difficulties which its judg-
ment may create as regards events in the past, is moved to restrict the 
possibility for all persons concerned of relying on the interpretation which the 
Court gives to a provision in response to a reference for a preliminary ruling. 
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The Court found that there was nothing in the documents on the present case 
to suggest that the financial balance of the scheme managed by VddB is likely 
to be retroactively disturbed if the effects of this judgment are not restricted in 
time. Accordingly, the Court did not limit the effect of the judgment in terms 
of time.
5. Comment
The main conclusion from the Maruko decision is this: in relation to matters 
falling within the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC, the Member States are 
obliged to treat in the same way married opposite-sex partners and registered 
same-sex partners if, under the national law, in relation to the relevant issue, 
registered partners and married partners are in a comparable situation. In the 
following comments on the Court’s considerations in Maruko, a number of 
issues will be discussed. Two issues are left aside, namely the direct effect of 
Article 2 of Directive 2000/78/EC and the temporal limitation of the effect of 
the Court’s judgment. In relation to the latter, suffice it to note that whilst 
Maruko is one more of many cases in which this issue is raised, the Court only 
very rarely decides in favour of such a limitation (Defrenne II,6 Barber,7 to 
mention two examples from the area of social non-discrimination law).
 Regarding direct effect, the Court of Justice does not address it in Maruko, 
most likely because the national court had not asked about it. It is probable that 
the national court did not have any doubts on this issue and, therefore, did not 
need any assistance from the Court of Justice in that respect. Most notably, the 
Maruko case did not pose the same problems as the much debated case 
Mangold,8 which concerned discrimination on grounds of age allegedly com-
mitted by an individual against another individual during the prolonged imple-
mentation period in the context of discrimination on grounds of age or 
disability. In the following comments, three issues are discussed: first, in the 
context of the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC, the role of recitals in preambles 
6. Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. SABENA, [1976] ECR 455.
7. Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, 
[1990] ECR I-1889.
8. Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, [2005] ECR I-9981; on Mangold, see 
e.g. Editorial comments, “Horizontal direct effect – A law of diminishing coherence?”, 43 CML 
Rev. (2006), 1–8, and Tobler, “Putting Mangold in perspective: in response to Editorial com-
ments, Horizontal direct effect – A law of diminishing coherence?”, 44 CML Rev. (2007), 
1177–1183. More recently, see also the Court’s judgment in Case C-427/06, Brigit Bartsch v. 
Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH) Altersfürsorge GmbH, judgment of 23 Sept. 2008, nyr. 
730  Case law CML Rev. 2009
to directives; second, the distinction between direct and indirect discrimina-
tion; and, third, the comparability of married and registered partners.9
5.1. The role of recitals in the Preamble to Directive 2000/78/EC for the   
 scope of the Directive
The longer a preamble, the more issues may arise in relation to it. Compared 
to early legislation, more recent secondary law of the EC often contains long 
preambles. For example, whilst Directive 64/221/EEC10 contained just four 
(unnumbered) recitals, the directive replacing it, namely Directive 2004/38/
EC,11 contains 31 of them. To mention two more (and more extreme) exam-
ples: the Preamble to the e-commerce Directive12 contains 65 recitals covering 
more than seven pages in the Official Journal, and the Services Directive13 
boasts the almost incredible number of 118 recitals covering more than 
14 pages. Compared to this, the 37 recitals of the Preamble to the Employment 
Equality Directive appear relatively modest. Even so, some of them have 
already caused debate. Maruko is an example.
 In Maruko, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer explains the difference 
between legislative provisions and recitals in preambles in the following man-
ner (para 76): “[L]egislative provisions describe facts, situations or circum-
stances and attribute certain consequences to them. The factual situation and 
the legal result are therefore the two essential elements of a legal rule. But the 
explanatory memorandum, the preamble or the introductory recitals, which 
merely seek to illustrate, state the reasons for or explain, do not form part of 
these essential elements, since, although they accompany, and usually precede, 
the enacting terms of the measure, forming a physical part of it, they have no 
binding force, notwithstanding their usefulness as criteria for interpretation, a 
role which the Court has frequently cited.”14 It should be noted that assisting 
9. See also Waaldijk, annotation of Maruko, (2008) European Human Rights Cases, No. 65, 
628–631.
10. Directive 64/221/EEC on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the move-
ment and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health, O.J. 1964, 56/850–857.
11. Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) 
No. 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 
75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC, O.J. 2004, L 158/77.
12. Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in partic-
ular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (“Directive on electronic commerce”), 
O.J. 2000, L 178/1.
13. Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market, O.J. 2006, L 376/36. 
14. Earlier, A.G. Tizzano in his Opinion on the BECTU case explained that preambles merely 
serve “the purpose of giving reasons for the substantive provisions which follow, not to lay down 
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interpretation is not the only function of recitals. At least as important are its 
functions in the context of the political and judicial control over the legality of 
the measure at issue.15
 Maruko illustrates that the assisting role of recitals is unproblematic where 
a recital correlates with an explicit provision of the directive at issue. In con-
trast, it can cause quite some debate where a recital stands alone, i.e. where 
there is no corresponding provision in the directive. In Directive 2000/78/EC, 
Recital 13 is an example of the former situation and Recital 22 the latter. In 
Maruko, the Court states that two parts of Article 3 of the Directive must be 
read in conjunction with Recital 13, namely Article 3(1)(c), which includes 
pay in the scope of the Directive, and Article 3(3), which excludes social secu-
rity from it. To these provisions, Recital 13 adds the link to Article 141 EC, 
which prescribes equal pay for men and women for equal work and for work 
of equal value, in relation to the meaning of the concept of “pay”. However, it 
is questionable whether the Court needed such prompting. After all, since it 
first began with the famous Barber case, a very considerable case law has 
developed in the area of sex equality law precisely on the delicate question 
when occupational pension benefits must be regarded as pay. It is therefore 
likely that even without Recital 13 the Court would have turned to this case 
law. Even though different types of discrimination raise different issues,16 
many basic legal issues are the same. Accordingly, the case law on sex dis-
crimination, which is both much older and much larger than that on Directive 
2000/78/EC or on Directive 2000/43/EC,17 will be often relied on when inter-
preting legal concepts under these directives. It is therefore not surprising that 
it was also relied on in Maruko – contrary to the argument made by the VddB, 
according to which the Barber case law could not apply because that case 
arose in a different type of dispute (see para 25 of the A.G.’s Opinion), and in 
spite of the fact that the legal consequences of the distinction between social 
security benefits and pay are not quite the same under Directive 2000/78/EC 
as under sex equality law or under Directive 2000/43/EC.18 In fact, the explicit 
legislative rules of their own”; Case C-173/99, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Trade and 
Industry, ex parte Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU), 
[2001] ECR I-4881, para 41 of the A.G.’s Opinion.
15. See e.g. Case 24/62, Germany v. Commission EEC, [1963] ECR 63. For the origins of the 
duty to give reasons contained in the EC Treaty, see the references in Waaldijk, Motiverings-
plichten van de wetgever (Vermande, Lelystad, 1994), pp. 324–326.
16. See e.g. McCrudden, “Thinking about the discrimination directives”, (2005) European 
Anti-Discrimination Law Review, 17–21, at 17.
17. Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, O.J. 2000, L 180/22.
18. If a particular case involves a social security benefit, this brings it outside the scope of 
Directive 2000/78/EC altogether. Under sex equality law, it means that Directive 79/7/EEC (on 
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wording of Recital 13 shows that both of these points are not relevant. More 
generally, it is well known that the Court of Justice sometimes even relies on 
case law from another area of law,19 though at the same time it will emphasize 
that the same term will not necessarily have the same meaning in all contexts 
but may differ, for example depending on whether the term is part of the defi-
nition of a fundamental right or of a derogation to such a right (compare e.g. 
the different interpretation of the term “pay” in the cases Allonby20 and Del 
Cerro Alonso21).
 Compared to Recital 13, Recital 22 in Directive 2000/78/EC caused much 
more of a debate. When implementing the Directive, at least three Member 
States (Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom) interpreted this recital as a basis 
for allowing more beneficial treatment of married partners.22 Indeed, courts in 
the United Kingdom and Germany have held that Recital 22 provides the legal 
basis for such different treatment.23 In Maruko, the national court noted that 
the content of Recital 22 is not reflected in the enacting terms of Directive 
2000/78/EC and it wondered whether such a Recital can restrict the scope of 
the Directive. According to the national court it is not appropriate, in view of 
the importance of the Community law principle of equal treatment, to interpret 
the progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in mat-
ters of social security, O.J. 1979, L 6/24) rather than Art. 141 EC applies. Under Art. 141(1) and 
(2) EC, different treatment of comparable cases on grounds of sex is absolutely prohibited (no 
justification possibilities). In contrast, under Art. 7 of Directive 79/7, the Member States are enti-
tled to exclude from the directive’s scope, among other things, the determination of pensionable 
age for the purposes of granting old-age and retirement pensions and the possible consequences 
thereof for other benefits (though Member States must periodically examine matters excluded 
under para 1 in order to ascertain, in the light of social developments in the matter concerned, 
whether there is justification for maintaining the exclusions concerned). The Race Directive 
(2000/43/EC, supra note 17) explicitly includes “social protection, including social security and 
healthcare” in its scope.
19. E.g. Case C-317/93, Inge Nolte v. Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, [1995] ECR 
I-4625, para 19, regarding the concept of the “working population”, where the Court referred, 
among other things, to case law from the area of free movement for workers. 
20. Case C-256/01, Debra Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lectur-
ing Services, trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employ-
ment, [2004] ECR I-873, para 66.
21. Case C-307/05, Yolanda Del Cerro Alonso v. Osakidetza-Servicio Vasco de Salud, [2007] 
ECR I-7109, para 39.
22. See Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European 
Union: National Laws and the Employment Equality Directive (Asser, The Hague, 2006), 
p. 115.
23. For Germany, see Lembke, “Sind an die Ehe geknüpfte Leistungen des Arbeitgebers 
auch an Lebenspartner zu gewähren?”, (2008) NJW, 1631–1634, at 1633. For the UK, see 
Gijzen, Selected Issues in Equal Treatment Law (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2006), pp. 364–370. 
Gijzen also describes the changes that were made to the marital status exception in the anti-dis-
crimination regulations when civil partnership legislation was introduced in the UK in 2005. 
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the recitals to the Directive broadly. Before the Court of Justice, Mr Maruko 
argued that if the Community legislature had wanted to exclude all benefits 
bound up with civil status from the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC, the content 
of that recital would have been the subject of a particular provision among the 
enacting terms of the Directive. According to the VddB and the United King-
dom Government, Recital 22 contains a clear and general exclusion and deter-
mines the scope of the Directive (para 39 of the judgment). The Commission 
thought that the recital does no more than state that the European Union lacks 
competence in matters regarding civil status. As for Advocate General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer, he argued that, “like the rest of the preamble, Recital 22 to 
Directive 2000/78 merely assists with the interpretation of the provisions of 
the Directive and its significance must not be overstated” (para 76 of the Opin-
ion).
 The arguments made by the parties in Maruko very much resemble those 
made in the earlier case Palacios de Villa,24 which concerned the question of 
whether the fixing of a statutory compulsory retirement age in employment 
falls within the scope of application of Directive 2000/78/EC. According to 
Recital 14, this Directive “shall be without prejudice to national provisions 
laying down retirement ages”. In Palacios de la Villa, the governments of 
Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom as well as the defend-
ant maintained that because of Recital 14 the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of age as laid down in the Directive does not apply to a national 
law such as the one in question (para 43 in the Advocate General’s Opinion). 
Similar questions are again asked in the pending cases Römer25 and Age Con-
cern England.26 However, both in Palacios de la Villa and in Maruko the Court 
refused to accept the reasoning that the recitals in question limit the Directive’s 
scope. Instead, it followed the line of argument of the Commission. In Pala-
cios de Villa, the Court stated (para 44 of the judgment): “It is true that, accord-
ing to recital 14 in its preamble, Directive 2000/78 is to be without prejudice 
to national provisions laying down retirement ages. However, that recital 
merely states that the directive does not affect the competence of the Member 
States to determine retirement age and does not in any way preclude the appli-
cation of that directive to national measures governing the conditions for ter-
mination of employment contracts where the retirement age, thus established, 
has been reached.”
24. Case C-411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa v. Corteﬁel Servicios SA, [2007] ECR I-8531. 
On Palacios de la Villa, see Waddington, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 895–905, in particular at 902.
25. Case C-147/08, Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, pending.
26. Case C-388/07, The Incorporated Trustees of the National Council on Ageing (Age Con-
cern England) v. Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, pending.
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 In Maruko (para 59 of the judgment), the Court explicitly adds what would 
appear to be implied in Palacios de la Villa, namely that whenever the  Member 
States exercise their competences, they must respect the limits set by Commu-
nity law and, in particular, the provisions relating to the principle of non-dis-
crimination. This is a well-known adage in the Court’s case law where it has 
been applied in such different contexts as direct taxation,27 social security 
systems,28 the organization of the Member States’ military forces,29 and collec-
tive action,30 to mention just a few examples. In effect, this means that the fact 
that the Treaty does not give the EC an explicit competence in a given field, 
thereby leaving it with the Member States, does not mean that EC law from 
other areas – either on the level of Treaty provisions or that of secondary law 
– cannot apply in this field. Put differently, the Member States’ competences 
are not “exclusive” in the sense that national legislation is immune from EC 
law. For the Member States, this may be difficult to accept, in particular where 
EC law touches upon fields that have traditionally been considered as Member 
State reserves, such as taxation, the army or marriage.31
 Against this background, the Court’s considerations in Maruko confirm that 
a reference to a Member State competence in the preamble to an EC law meas-
ure does not mean that the application of this measure is thereby excluded.32 
Rather, whether or not the measure applies depends on its field of application. 
In the specific context of Maruko, it follows that those Member States that, 
within the field of application of the Directive, allow for disadvantageous 
27. E.g. Case 270/83, Commission v. France, [1986] ECR 273 (Avoir ﬁscal), para 24, and 
many cases since.
28. This is the example to which the Court refers in Maruko, by mentioning Case C-372/04, 
The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of 
State for Health, [2006] ECR I-4325, para 92, and Case C-444/05, Aikaterini Stamatelaki v. 
NPDD Organismos Asfaliseos Eleftheron Epangelmation (OAEE), [2007] ECR I-3185, para 
23.
29. Case C-273/97, Angela Maria Sirdar v. The Army Board and Secretary of State for 
Defence, [1999] ECR I-7403, para 16; Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land, [2000] ECR I-69, para 16; Case C-186/01, Alexander Dory v. Germany, [2003] ECR 
I-2479, para 31.
30. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v. Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [2007] ECR I-10779, para 40. 
31. Apart from the issue of competences, family law is a prime example of an area where EC 
law has an influence simply because of the frequent reference in EC law to concepts coming 
from this area; see e.g. Tobler, “Der Begriff der Ehe im EG-Recht”, (2001) Die Praxis des Fami-
lienrechts, 479–499. More recently, see e.g. Art. 2 of Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 11.
32. See also Brinktrine (case note on Maruko), (2008) Justistenzeitung, 790–792, at 791, and 
Driguez, Discrimination en raison de l’orientation sexuelle, Europe 2008 Mai Comm. No. 150, 
13.
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treatment of same-sex partners simply based on Recital 22, as mentioned 
above, will have to reconsider their laws in the light of the Maruko decision.
 Finally, even though the Court does not say so explicitly in Maruko, it is 
clear that for the issue of the basic division of competences between the EC 
and its Member States it does not matter whether or not a recital in a preamble 
relates to an explicit provision in the piece of secondary legislation at issue. 
After all, a recital such as Recital 22 contains a mere statement of a fact that 
exists independent of the Directive, namely as part of the constitutional system 
set up by the EC Treaty.33 Evidently, this constitutional framework can neither 
be changed by a recital nor by a provision in a Directive, not even by a combi-
nation of a provision and a recital.
5.2. The distinction between direct and indirect discrimination
On the level of substance, the finding that a case like that of Mr Maruko, turn-
ing in fact about the sex of his partner, has to be examined in the light of the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, rather than sex 
or any other ground of discrimination, is not new in EC law. It can already be 
derived from the Court’s judgment in Grant.34 The same approach has been 
taken by the European Court of Human Rights (Karner),35 and by the UN 
Human Rights Committee (Young v. Australia,36 X v. Colombia).37 According 
to this case law (all about unequal treatment of same-sex and different-sex 
unmarried cohabiting partners), sexual orientation not only refers to a charac-
teristic of a person but also to his or her relationship with another person.38 
 Much more surprising is the finding in Maruko that the disputed differen-
tiation between married and registered partners involves direct discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation, rather than indirect discrimination on that 
ground, as had been argued by the Commission, Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer and even Mr Maruko himself. The distinction between the two con-
cepts is important for practical reasons. First, in most contexts the possibilities 
of justification are fewer in the case of direct discrimination than in the case of 
indirect discrimination, since direct discrimination can only be justified on the 
33. Similarly, de Schutter, Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orienta-
tion in the EU Member States. Part I – Legal Analysis (European Union Agency for Fundamen-
tal Rights, Vienna, 2008), p. 55. 
34. Grant, supra note 1.
35. Karner v. Austria, judgment of 24 July 2003, application No. 40016/98, ECHR 
2003-IX.
36. Young v. Australia, decision No. 941/2000 of 29 Aug. 2003.
37. X v. Colombia, decision No. 1361/2005 of 30 March 2007. 
38. Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, op. cit. supra note 22, pp. 110–117.
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basis of justification grounds stated in the law. In fact, under Directive 2000/78/
EC, only with respect to the ground of age can direct discrimination be justi-
fied on the basis of objective reasons in a broad sense of the word.39 For other 
types of discrimination, the Directive provides a limited number of specified 
justification grounds (none of which seem relevant in the case of Maruko). In 
fact, it has been suggested that in Maruko the Court opted for a finding of 
direct discrimination in order to exclude the objective justification argument of 
fostering marriage, that had been accepted by the German courts on the basis 
of Article 6 of the German Constitution.40 Second, indirect discrimination may 
be less easy to prove than direct discrimination, in particular where the law 
requires proof on the basis of statistics. Under Directive 2000/78/EC, statisti-
cal proof is not necessary. However, regarding the appreciation of the facts 
from which it may be inferred that there has been discrimination, Recital 15 in 
the preamble to the Directive refers to rules of national law or practice. The 
same recital explicitly states that such rules “may provide, in particular, for 
indirect discrimination to be established by any means including on the basis 
of statistical evidence”.
 The Maruko decision does not offer any real explanation as to what brought 
the Court to apply a direct rather than an indirect discrimination approach. The 
Court notes that under German law marriage remains reserved to heterosexual 
couples, and that, in order to grant same-sex couples the possibility to enter 
into a formal relationship, a special regime was introduced in 2001 in the form 
of a registered partnership, which the national court considers as equivalent to 
a marriage for present purposes. The Court further notes that under the pension 
scheme of the VddB a surviving registered partner is treated less favourably 
than a surviving married partner. From this, the Court then simply concludes 
that there is direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, provided 
that – so far as concerns the survivor’s benefit at issue – the situation of surviv-
ing registered partners is comparable to that of surviving married partners. In 
most academic comments, this finding is welcomed,41 though finding the 
39. Art. 6 of the Directive, which was at issue in Mangold, cited supra note 8. Further exam-
ples where objective justification is possible for direct discrimination are: Clause 4 in the Annex 
to Directive 97/81/EC concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by 
UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC, O.J. 1998, L 14/9; Clause 4 in the Annex to Directive 1999/70/
EC concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and 
CEEP, O.J. 1999, L 175/43, and Art. 4 of Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, 
O.J. 2004, L 373/37. 
40. Lembke, op. cit. supra note 23, 1633.
41. E.g. Mahlmann, “Gleichstellung gleichgeschlechtlicher Lebenspartnerschaften bei Hin-
ter bliebenenversorgung», (2008) EuZW, 314–319, at 319; Potz, “Gleichstellung homosexueller 
Paare bei der Hinterbliebenenversorgung?”, (2008) Österreichisches Recht der Wirtschaft, 
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 reasons for the Court’s approach is not easy. When searching for such an expla-
nation, it may be useful to recall the fact that, different from an earlier genera-
tion of EC non-discrimination law, the Employment Equality Directive contains 
legal definitions of both direct and indirect discrimination. Under Article 2(2)
(a), “direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated 
less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation, on any of the grounds referred to in Article 1”. In situations of direct 
discrimination the link with the discrimination ground is strong both in form 
and in substance. Regarding the form, the link is straightforward inasmuch as 
a prohibited ground is explicitly and obviously relied on. For example, people 
of colour are refused access to a nightclub whilst other people are accepted. 
Regarding substance, the entire group of the disadvantaged consists of people 
of colour, whilst the entire group of the advantaged consists of other people. 
This is typical for direct discrimination. In contrast, indirect discrimination 
concerns cases where “an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice” 
would put persons protected by the relevant provision “at a particular disad-
vantage compared with other persons” (Art. 2(2)(b) of the Directive). Here, the 
link with the discrimination criterion is weaker both in form and in substance. 
On the level of form, there is a reliance on an apparently neutral criterion. On 
the level of substance, it is characteristic for indirect discrimination that the 
division between the groups that are differently affected (i.e. those advantaged 
and those disadvantaged by the measure in question) is not quite the same as 
in the case of direct discrimination. Typically, the group of the disadvantaged 
is consisting not exclusively, but only disproportionately of persons that are 
protected by the discrimination ground in question. Accordingly, they are 
“merely” over-represented in the disadvantaged group. This may be illustrated 
by using the classic example of part-time work in the context of sex discrimi-
nation. Where part-time workers are treated less favourably than full-time 
workers, this will normally disproportionately affect women. This is due to the 
fact that in many countries of the EU a traditional division of roles in the fam-
ily applies, according to which it is predominantly women who perform domes-
tic work and care work, which in turn makes it difficult for women to engage 
in full-time work outside the home. At the same time, there is nothing to pre-
vent men from working part-time, and some men (though a considerably 
smaller percentage than that of women) indeed do. Accordingly, worse treat-
ment of part-time workers than full-time workers will affect not only women, 
but also these men.
405–408, at 404; Weisse-Marchal, “Le droit à une pension de veuf du partenaire de vie du même 
sexe”, (2008) Recueil Dalloz, 1873–1876, at 1876; and Lhernould, “Les droits sociaux des cou-
ples homosexuals”, (2008) Droit social, 712–716, at 714. Conversely, Lembke, op. cit. supra 
note 23, 1633, criticizes the Court of Justice’s finding of direct discrimination.
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 Before the Maruko case came to the Court, some academic writers had 
already argued that such cases involve direct discrimination on grounds of sex-
ual orientation, though they usually expected that the Court would find indi-
rect discrimination once it would be presented with such a case.42 This 
expectation was justified in view of case law of the Court of Justice that did put 
the emphasis on the formal aspect. Under this case law, any measure that did 
not formally rely on a prohibited criterion would be assessed in the framework 
of indirect discrimination, even if its substantive effect was (practically) the 
same as in the case of direct discrimination. The only somewhat special case 
was disadvantageous treatment on grounds of pregnancy, which the Court con-
sidered equivalent to sex, because of the fact that by nature only women can 
become pregnant (Dekker,43 para 12). Here the disadvantaged group consisted 
not (only) disproportionately but exclusively of women. Outside this special 
case, the Court’s approach, as briefly described, is illustrated by Schnorbus, a 
sex equality case decided in 2000.44 This case concerned admission to practi-
cal legal training in Germany. Since there were more applications than places, 
the law provided for the postponing of applications, with certain derogations 
in cases of hardship. One of these derogations concerned persons who had 
done compulsory military or civil service. Under German law, this applied 
exclusively to men. As a result, only men could benefit from this particular 
hardship clause, and women could never benefit from it. Asked whether this 
amounts to direct or to indirect sex discrimination, the Court stated that “only 
provisions which apply differently according to the sex of the persons con-
cerned can be regarded as constituting discrimination directly based on sex” 
(Schnorbus, para 33). The Court therefore analysed the hardship clause in the 
light of the concept of indirect sex discrimination. This was criticized in aca-
demic writing where it was suggested that in view of their substantive effects 
42. Bell, “Sexual orientation discrimination in employment: an evolving role for the Euro-
pean Union” in Wintemute and Andenas (Eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships 
(Hart, Oxford, 2001), pp. 653–676, at p. 668; Waaldijk, “Towards the recognition of same-sex 
partners in European Union law: Expectations based on trends in national law” in ibid., 
pp. 635–651, at p. 645; Ytterberg, “Sweden” in Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, Combating sexual 
orientation discrimination in employment (Universiteit Leiden, Leiden, 2004), pp. 439–477, at 
pp. 459–460 (available at http://hdl.handle.net/1887/12587); Wintemute, “United Kingdom” in 
ibid., pp. 479–518, at p. 495; Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, op. cit. supra note 23, pp. 42 and 
115–117.
43. Case C-177/88, Johanna Paciﬁca Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong Vol-
wassenen (VJV Centrum) Plus, [1990] ECR I-3941.
44. Case C-79/99, Julia Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, [2000] ECR I-10997. Other, earlier 
examples concern the obligation to perform military service; see Tobler, Indirect Discrimination. 
A Case Study into the Development of the Legal Concept of Indirect Discrimination under EC Law 
(Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford, 2005), pp. 308 et seq. 
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such cases should be analysed in the context of direct discrimination.45 How-
ever, the same approach can also be found in national case law. For example, 
the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission (which is a quasi-judicial equality 
body dealing with discrimination cases on many grounds) in cases comparable 
to Maruko found indirect discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.46 It 
is, therefore, not surprising that Mr Maruko himself, the Commission and 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer all argued in favour of indirect dis-
crimination.
 However, more recently the Court appears to have moved away from an 
approach that focuses on form alone. Before Maruko, this could already be 
observed in Nikoloudi, which was decided in 2005.47 Nikoloudi is a rather com-
plex case concerning rules under a collective agreement on the promotion of 
temporary staff to established staff. Under those rules, only temporary staff 
that had worked full-time for at least two years were eligible for the position 
of established member of staff. The case concerned a female temporary staff 
member who, after having been employed part-time as a cleaner, worked full-
time for a little less than two years and for that reason did not qualify for the 
promotion to established staff member. The national court seized with the mat-
ter asked the Court of Justice whether such a case involves indirect sex dis-
crimination, even if the rule excluding part-timers from promotion in fact only 
affected female cleaners. The reason for this was a provision in the General 
Staff Regulations stipulating that only women could be taken on as part-time 
cleaners. Ms Nikoloudi, the Commission and Advocate General Stix-Hackl all 
argued that such a case involved indirect sex discrimination.
 However, the Court found that “the … exclusion of a possibility of appoint-
ment as an established member of staff by reference, ostensibly neutral as to 
the worker’s sex, to a category of workers which, under national rules having 
the force of law, is composed exclusively of women constitutes direct discrim-
ination on grounds of sex” (Nikoloudi, para 36). The Court added that where, 
in spite of the General Staff Regulations, the part-time work force did in fact 
include some men, the analysis would have to be one of indirect discrimination 
(Nikoloudi, paras. 44 et seq.). In Maruko, the Court takes the same approach. 
In both cases, it would seem that the Court has shifted its focus away from 
45. Tobler, op. cit. supra note 44, pp. 312 et seq., with further references; also Bell, “Direct 
Discrimination” in Schiek, Waddington and Bell (Eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on National, 
Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Hart, Oxford, 2007), pp. 185–322, at 
p. 218.
46. E.g. Dutch Equal Treatment Commission decision of 19 Oct. 1998 in Case 1998/115 
(text available at www.cgb.nl).
47. Case C-196/02, Vasiliki Nikoloudi v. Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE, [2005] 
ECR I-1789.
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form to substance. It is a move away from an approach under which only 
measures that are explicitly based on the prohibited criterion or on a criterion 
that is by nature indissociably linked to it (such as pregnancy in the case of 
sex) amount to direct discrimination. Instead, direct discrimination now also 
includes measures that are formally neutral but that, due to legislative provi-
sions or to binding rules of the employer, have the same exclusionary effect as 
measures directly relying on the prohibited criterion. This means that direct 
discrimination now also includes cases where reliance on a formally neutral 
criterion in fact only affects one protected group, be it by nature or because of 
a rule that has the force of law. In contrast, indirect discrimination relates to 
cases where an apparently neutral criterion has as an effect that is less far-
reaching but still reaches the required level of disparate impact or particular 
disadvantage.48
 A similar approach was already reflected in a case decided in 1990 in the 
United Kingdom, namely James v. Eastleigh Borough Council,49 which con-
cerned sex discrimination and pensionable age. In this case, which concerned 
free entry to a swimming pool for women once they had reached the age of 60 
and for men once they had reached the age of 65, the House of Lords decided 
that given the legal situation in the UK at the time, reliance on the pensionable 
age could not be regarded as a requirement or condition which is applied 
equally to persons of either sex, because it was by itself discriminatory between 
the sexes. Instead, it was no more than a convenient shorthand expression that 
referred to the age of 60 in a woman and to the age of 65 in a man. Comment-
ing on this decision, Gijzen notes that its consequence is that policies that are 
founded on a status-based criterion are not susceptible for objective justifica-
tion.50 According to Gijzen this is a correct approach. The present writers agree, 
because such criteria do not merely have a disparate impact within the mean-
ing of the concept of indirect discrimination, but indeed an effect which is sub-
stantially the same as that of direct discrimination.
 Finally, it is important to note that the Court of Justice’s approach to the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect discrimination in Maruko is not a result of 
the modern legal definition of direct discrimination under Directive 2000/78/
EC. After all, the Court relied on the same approach in Nikoloudi, which 
was decided under Directive 76/207/EEC in its original version.51 Since this 
48. As to the situation where national law does not reserve partnership registration to same-
sex couples only, see below, in the section on comparability.
49. James v. Eastleigh Borough Council, [1990] 2 All ER 607.
50. Gijzen, op. cit. supra note 23, p. 103.
51. Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, O.J. 1976, L 39/40.
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Directive did not contain any legal definitions of discrimination,52 the case law 
definition of direct discrimination applied, which is somewhat different from 
that under Directive 2000/78/EC.53
5.3. The comparability of married and registered partners
A final element to be discussed is the requirement of comparability contained 
in the definition of direct discrimination in Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive 
2000/78/EC. The national laws of several Member States, including Romania, 
Belgium and The Netherlands, do not mention such a requirement.54 As for EC 
law, it must be remembered that under the general definition of equality and 
discrimination in EC law (which, according to the Court,55 “are simply two 
labels for a single general principle of Community law” and thus mean the 
same), the right to equal treatment presupposes a comparability of situations. 
According to the Court, “discrimination can arise only through the application 
of different rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule 
to different situations”.56 This broad definition mirrors the general principle of 
non-discrimination or equal treatment, (sometimes also called “general princi-
ple of equality”), which underpins the whole of EC law and which requires 
that what is like (comparable) be treated alike whereas that what is different be 
treated differently according to the degree of difference, unless there is objec-
tive justification.57 Against this background the express reference to the require-
ment of comparability in the definition of direct discrimination in Article 2(2)
(a) does not add anything new or surprising.
52. The directive was later amended by Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 
76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, 
O.J. 2002, L 269/1. It will be replaced by Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employ-
ment and occupation (recast), O.J. 2006, L 204/23. Both the amending directive and the Recast 
Directive contain legal definitions of direct and indirect discrimination.
53. Tobler, op. cit. supra note 44, pp. 288 et seq.
54. Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, op. cit. supra note 22, pp. 99 and 159; Bell, op. cit. supra 
note 45, p. 209. Until 2008, this was also true for France, but Law 2008–496 of 27 May 2008 
(portant diverses dispositions d’adaptation au droit communautaire dans le domaine de la lutte 
contre les discriminations) has now introduced a definition of direct discrimination that is very 
similar to that of the Directive.
55. Case C-422/02 P, Europe Chemi-Con (Deutschland) GmbH v. Council and Commission, 
[2005] ECR I-791, para 33. 
56. E.g. Case C-157/02, Rieser Internationale Transporte GmbH v. Autobahnen- und Schnell-
straßen-Finanzierungs-AG (Asﬁnag), [2004] ECR I-1477, para 39.
57. E.g. Case C-390/06, Nuova Agricast Srl v. Ministero delle Attività Produttive, judgment 
of 15 April 2008, nyr., para 66.
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 Whether or not Mr Maruko will actually win his case in Germany depends 
on whether the national court considers that, under German law, his situation 
is comparable with that of a surviving spouse. In this context, it must be noted 
that the comparability – as concerns the survivor’s benefit at issue – is to be 
judged “under national law” (para 73 of the judgment). Advocate General Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer describes the essential features of the German Lebenspartner-
schaft (registered partnership) as follows (para 17 the Opinion):
“Paragraph 1(1) provides that, to register such a union, it is necessary to 
demonstrate the desire to set up a life-long partnership. For the duration of 
the relationship, the partners must support and care for one another (Para-
graph 2). They must contribute to the common needs of the partnership 
and, with regard to maintenance obligations, they are bound by the provi-
sions of the Civil Code applicable to spouses (Paragraph 5). Like spouses, 
the partners are subject to the financial system of common ownership of 
property acquired ex post facto, although they are free to agree to a differ-
ent system (Paragraph 6). In addition, each partner is regarded as a mem-
ber of the other partner’s family (Paragraph 11). In a further similarity to 
the provisions of the Civil Code, should the partners separate, the mainte-
nance obligation remains (Paragraph 16) and there must be an equalising 
apportionment of pension entitlements (Paragraph 20).”
At first sight, Mr Maruko’s chances seem good: when requesting a preliminary 
ruling from the Court of Justice, the Bayerisches Verwaltungsgericht München 
has already indicated that in its view a registered partnership, while not identi-
cal to marriage, places persons of the same sex in a situation comparable to that 
of spouses so far as concerns the survivor’s benefit at issue in the case (para 69 
of the judgment). The national court in particular took into account that in 2004 
the German law on statutory widow’s or widower’s pensions was changed in 
such a way as to treat registered partnerships as equivalent to marriages. How-
ever, it cannot be ruled out that a favourable judgment of the national court of 
first instance would be overturned by a higher instance, based on the argument 
that, under German law there are more legal differences between a registered 
partnership and a marriage than in some of the other countries where such reg-
istrations are possible. In the different context of family allowances, some Ger-
man courts have ruled that marriage and registered partnership are not 
comparable.58 However, in the present writers’ opinion, this case law is not rel-
evant for the present purposes where a survivor’s benefit is at issue.59 After all, 
58. See e.g. BVerwG 2 C33.06, judgment of the German Federal Administrative Court of 
15 Nov. 2007, as well as 2 BvR 1830/06, decision of the German Constitutional Court of 6 May 
2008, with further references.
59. Perhaps not surprisingly, one of the lawyers who represented Mr Maruko at the ECJ is 
of the same opinion: Bruns, “Der EuGH beendet die deutsche Sonderrechtssprechung zur 
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the Court of Justice does not require comparability (let alone similarity) of reg-
istered partnership legislation and marriage legislation in general, but only 
comparability “so far as concerns that survivor’s pension” (para 73 of the judg-
ment, repeated in the operative part of the judgment).
 It is important to note that Maruko only deals with the situation in a Mem-
ber State that has chosen to introduce a form of registered partnership. The 
Directive does not require other Member States to do likewise. Under the con-
stitutional framework set up by the EC Treaty the Member States retain the 
competence to decide on the forms of civil status that are available under their 
national legal system. Indeed, cases identical to that of Maruko will not arise in 
all Member States, because many of them do not yet have a form of registered 
partnership. Of those Member States that do have a form of registered partner-
ship for same-sex couples, three also allow same-sex couples to marry (Spain, 
Belgium and The Netherlands), so there the argument that employment discrim-
ination between married and registered partners amounts to sexual orientation 
discrimination, can only be made with respect to the brief period after the intro-
duction of registered partnership and before the opening up of marriage. In Den-
mark, Finland, Sweden and the UK the legal effects of registered partnership are 
almost identical to those of marriage, so there the argument that such discrimi-
nation amounts to direct sexual orientation discrimination can easily be made. It 
will be interesting to see in what contexts the national courts in France,60 Lux-
embourg, Slovenia and the Czech Republic, where registered partnership entails 
less rights and obligations,61 will speak of comparable situations of registered 
and married partners.
 A complication in France is that in that country partnership registration (pacte 
civil de solidarité) is also available to different-sex couples (as is the case in Bel-
gium, The Netherlands and most parts of Spain). The Maruko judgment does not 
make clear whether in such a situation an allegation of discrimination between 
married and registered partners should also be treated as direct sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. In its Nikoloudi judgment the Court had specified that if the 
Benachteiligung verpartneter Beschäftigter”, (2008) EuZW, 257–258, and “Die Maruko-Ent-
scheidung im Spannungsfeld zwischen europäischer und nationaler Auslegung”, (2008) NJW, 
1929–1931. See also Pärli, “Anspruch auf Hinterbliebenenrente für Partner aus gleichgeschlecht-
licher Partnerschaft”, (2007) European Law Reporter, 455–458, at 457.
60. In France, opinions as to the comparability of registered partnership and marriage are 
divided. Referring to jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat, Weisse-Marchal, op. cit. supra note 
41, 1876, emphasizes the differences. Referring to jurisprudence of the Conseil constitutionnel, 
Lhernould, op. cit. supra note 41, 712, takes the opposite view.
61. See Waaldijk and Fassin, Droit conjugal et unions de même sexe – Mariage, partenariat 
et concubinage dans neuf pays européens (PUF, Paris, 2008), plus the report More or less 
together – Levels of legal consequences of marriage, cohabitation and registered partnership 
for different-sex and same-sex partners (INED, Paris, 2005) on which that book is based, avail-
able at hdl.handle.net/1887/12585.
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disadvantaged category of workers did not consist exclusively of women, there 
could be no direct but only indirect sex discrimination.62 If that approach of the 
Court still holds, it would seem that French same-sex registered partners wish-
ing to challenge unequal treatment of married and registered couples, cannot 
invoke the prohibition of direct sexual orientation discrimination, but only that 
of indirect sexual orientation discrimination.63 However, it could also be argued 
that even in countries where registered partnership is available to same-sex and 
different-sex couples alike (and where marriage is only available to different-
sex couples), the denial of a certain benefit of marriage to registered partners 
still excludes all same-sex partners (and not just a much higher percentage of 
partners of the same sex than of different sex). Arguably, it could therefore (also) 
be considered as direct sexual orientation discrimination – provided the compa-
rability test is met.
 It is similarly unclear whether, in countries without registered partnership,64 
unregistered same-sex partners challenging their exclusion from a marital bene-
fit, should invoke the prohibition of direct sexual orientation discrimination or 
that of indirect sexual orientation discrimination. If, relying on Nikoloudi, they 
would go for the route of indirect discrimination, another question arises: does a 
comparability test apply? Different from the definition of direct discrimination, 
the definition of indirect discrimination in Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/78/
EC does not mention a requirement of comparability. From this, it has been con-
cluded that in the case of indirect discrimination the comparability test does not 
apply.65 On the other hand, as indicated above, the Court of Justice has consist-
ently held that “discrimination can arise only through the application of dif-
ferent rules to comparable situations or the application of the same rule to 
different situations”.66 The Maruko judgment, which deals with direct discrim-
ination, does not address the question. 
62. Vasiliki Nikoloudi v. Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE, cited supra note 47, para 
57. 
63. Of course they could also invoke the prohibition of direct discrimination based on “situ-
ation de famille”, see Lhernould, op. cit. supra note 41.
64. In Portugal and Hungary (non-married, non-registered) same-sex couples enjoy a certain 
number of the rights and obligations of marriage, in Austria and Ireland very few, and in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Italy probably 
none. Among the unmarried couples in these countries, there is evidently a much higher percent-
age of all same-sex couples than of all different-sex couples. See Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi, 
op. cit. supra note 22, pp. 83 and 115.
65. Schiek, “Indirect discrimination” in Schiek, Waddington and Bell, op. cit. supra note 45, 
pp. 323–475, at pp. 468–471 (with further references). See also Waaldijk, op. cit. supra note 9, 
p. 630.
66. Tobler, Limits and potential of the concept of indirect discrimination (Office for Official 
Publications, Luxembourg, 2008) (text available at www.migpolgroup.com/documents/4230.
html), under IV.2.2.1; compare also Lembke, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1633.
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 The authors of the present annotation hold diverging views on this issue. 
According to Tobler, comparability remains an essential precondition to the 
right to equal treatment under any EC law in the context of both the prohibi-
tions of direct and indirect discrimination. Accordingly, reliance on the latter 
would not do away with the problem that the comparability requirement would 
inevitably pose in comparing the situations of non-married, non-registered 
same-sex couples with those of married opposite-sex couples. Indeed, it is to 
be expected that comparability would be the decisive stumbling block that 
would prevent a finding of any type of discrimination. In contrast, Waaldijk 
would argue that for an analysis of indirect discrimination the comparability 
requirement does not apply. That requirement has been correctly left out of the 
Directive’s definition of indirect discrimination, because indirect discrimina-
tion does not imply a difference in treatment, but instead focuses on a differ-
ence in impact.67 Once a “particular disadvantage” (for persons of a particular 
sexual orientation) has been established, it is irrelevant whether or not this is 
caused by different treatment of comparable situations. The particular disad-
vantage may even be caused by a failure to distinguish between different situ-
ations (in this case: the situation of same-sex couples who could not marry on 
the one hand, and the situation of different-sex couples who have chosen not 
to get married on the other).68 However, whatever the correct approach, the 
present authors find that there is no foundation for the claim of Weisse-Mar-
chal69 that for the prohibition of indirect discrimination to apply, there should 
not simply be a comparable situation but a legally identical situation.
 Finally, it might be added that the Maruko judgement will probably not 
have a great impact on the EU’s internal employment law because under the 
Staff Regulations registered non-marital partnerships are already treated as 
marriages provided that certain formal conditions are fulfilled.70 The Staff 
67. Schiek, op. cit. supra note 45, p. 471.
68. See the individual opinions of members Lallah and Scheinin appended to the views of the 
Human Rights Committee in Joslin v. New Zealand, Decision No. 902/1999 of 17 July 2002.
69. Weisse-Marchal, op. cit. supra note 41, p. 1876.
70. See Art. 1d of the Staff Regulations, in conjunction with Art. 1(2)(c) of Annex VII. The 
latter provision speaks of “an official who is registered as a stable non-marital partner, provided 
that: (i) the couple produces a legal document recognised as such by a Member State, or any 
competent authority of a Member State, acknowledging their status as non-marital partners, (ii) 
neither partner is in a marital relationship or in another non-marital partnership, (iii) the partners 
are not related in any of the following ways: parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sis-
ter, aunt, uncle, nephew, niece, son-in-law, daughter-in-law; (iv) the couple has no access to legal 
marriage in a Member State; a couple shall be considered to have access to legal marriage for the 
purposes of this point only where the members of the couple meet all the conditions laid down 
by the legislation of a Member State permitting marriage of such a couple.” See ec.europa.eu/
civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf
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Regulations do not require that the rights and obligations attached to such part-
nerships are comparable to those of marriage.
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